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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v,

:

DAYTON J. ("ROCKY") BELGARD,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900267-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a
firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (1990), in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was the trial court's denial of defendant's motion

to arrest judgment proper?

Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides that the trial court may arrest judgment upon
a showing of "good cause."

Thus, the decision to grant or deny

an arrest of judgment is a matter of discretion with the trial
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that
discretion.

See State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App.

1989); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984),

overruled on other grounds, State v, John, 770 P.2d 994, 995
(Utah 1989).
2.

Are the trial court's findings on various issues

adequate for a meaningful review where the trial court did not
make written findings of fact and its oral findings were sketchy?
If this Court determines that the findings are not adequate to
enable it to meaningfully review the issues on appeal, it may
remand for more detailed findings.

State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d

767, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 12(b)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure
Any defense, objection or request, including
request for rulings on the admissibility of
evidence, which is capable of determination
without the trial of the general issue may be
raised prior to trial by written motion. The
following shall be raised at least five days
prior to the trial.
(2) motions concerning the admissibility
of evidence[.]
Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
A motion made before trial shall be
determined before trial unless the court for
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred
for later determination. Where factual
issues are involved in determining a motion,
the court shall state its findings on the
record.
Rule 12(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Failure of the defendant to timely raise
defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial or at the
time set by the court shall constitute waiver .
thereof, but the court for cause shown may
grant relief from such waiver.

Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
At any time prior to the imposition of
sentence, the court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall,
arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense,
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is
other good cause for the arrest of judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Dayton J. ("Rocky") Belgard, was charged
with possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a)
(1990)

(Record [hereinafter "R."] at 7). Defendant was

convicted after a bench trial on October 10, 1989 (R. 30).
Defendant made a motion for a new trial which was denied in a
minute entry (R. 51). Defendant subsequently filed a motion to
arrest judgment which was also denied (R. 120). Defendant was
sentenced May 2, 1990, to a term of not more than five years in
the Utah State Prison with credit for time served (13 months) (R.
123.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by
a restricted person, a third degree felony, based on evidence
seized by a police officer incident to a search of defendant's
motel room.

The record is devoid of any indication that

defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him
either before or during trial. After he was convicted, defendant

The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "or
probation" and substituted "in a correctional facility" for "at
the Utah state prison or other like facility" in Subsection
(2)(a), substituted "but" for "and" in Subsection (2)(b), and
made minor stylistic changes which do not affect the conviction
here.
-3-

filed a new trial motion asserting that the evidence against him
should have been suppressed (R. 32). The trial court denied that
motion in a minute entry (R. 51; a copy of the minute entry
denying defendant's motion for new trial is attached hereto as
Addendum A ) .

Defendant then filed a motion for the arrest of

judgment asserting that the evidence against him was obtained in
violation of his fourth amendment rights and principles of
collateral estoppel (R. 60). An evidentiary hearing on the
motion was held and the court heard testimony from officer Bruce
Maxwell for the State and Kimberly Belgard for defendant (R. 73).
Following the evidentiary hearing, both parties submitted
memorandum (R. 74, State's memorandum; R. 91, defendant's
memorandum).

Defendant requested and the court granted a hearing

for oral argument on the motion (R. 102). In denying defendant's
motion to arrest judgment the trial court made the following oral
findings:

(1) the officer's knock on defendant's motel room door

was comparable to a Terry stop, and (2) the handgun was in plain
view on the bed (Transcript of arrest of judgment hearing, April
16, 1990 [hereinafter "T3.M] at 12-14; a copy is attached hereto
as addendum B).

No written findings were issued (R. 120; a copy

of the order denying an arrest of judgment is attached hereto as
o
Addendum C ) .
2
A review of the record is hampered by the mislabeling of the
(1) State's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Motion to Suppress (R, 74); (2) defendant's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Arrest of
Judgment and for Suppression of Evidence (R. 91); and (3) the
trial court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Arrest of
Judgment and for Suppression of Evidence (R. 120). Although the
above labels suggest that a motion to suppress was actually
filed, as noted previously, the record is devoid of any
-A-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's allegation that the evidence against him
was obtained pursuant to an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of his fourth amendment rights was not timely and
should not be considered on appeal.

There is no indication in

the record that a motion to suppress was filed on behalf of
defendant either before or during trial.

Rather, the trial court

was first made aware of defendant's objections to the
admissibility of the evidence against him in the postverdict
motions for new trial and arrest of judgment.

Furthermore, the

record does not indicate that the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to arrest judgment was an abuse of discretion;
therefore, the denial of defendant's motion on the merits is not
subject to reversal.
Alternatively, should this Court determine that
defendant's motion to arrest judgment was timely made, the
failure of the trial court to issue adequate findings of fact
will not allow this Court to meaningfully review the appellate
issues.

Therefore, this Court should remand this case for more

detailed findings.

2
Cont. indication that a motion to suppress was ever filed on
behalf of defendant in this case.
-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S SUPPRESSION CLAIM WAS NOT TIMELY
AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL**
As noted previously, a review of the record below is
somewhat hampered by the mislabeling of several documents.
Therefore, it is important at the outset of the State's analysis
to clarify the record on appeal.

Defendant was convicted after a

bench trial of possession of a firearm by a restricted person (R.
30).

Rather than appealing his conviction, defendant filed a

motion for new trial asserting (1) that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not
move to suppress the evidence prior to trial and (2) that the
evidence against him was incredible and/or insufficient.
Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied the
defendant's new trial motion in a minute entry (R. 51; see
Addendum A ) .

Defendant did not appeal the trial court's ruling,

electing to file a motion to arrest judgment instead (R. 60). In
support of his motion to arrest judgment, defendant raised
substantially the same argument as in his new trial motion with
the exception that he did not argue that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel.

Defendant asserted that the

evidence against him was obtained pursuant to an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of his fourth amendment rights
and principles of collateral estoppel (R. 60). In denying
defendant's motion to arrest judgment the trial court made
3
At the present time the State makes no representation
concerning the validity of defendant's appellate argument.

sketchy oral findings on the merits of defendant's substantive
claim (T3. 12-14; see Addendum B).

On appeal to this Court,

defendant again challenges the trial court's denial of his motion
to arrest judgment on the ground that the arresting officer was
obligated to secure a warrant before arresting him and that, as a
result, the evidence seized incident to that arrest should have
been suppressed.
Defendant's argument is properly disposed of on waiver
grounds.

Defendant did not file a motion to suppress either

before or during trial but instead presented it for the first
4
time in a motion for new trial.
After his new trial motion was
denied, defendant again argued that the evidence should have been
suppressed in a subsequent motion to arrest judgment which was
similarly denied.

Thus, defendant's suppression claim was not

timely and should not be considered on appeal. £f. State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (objection raised for
first time in motion for new trial not timely); Broberq v. Hess,
782 P.2d 198, 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (appellant cannot for
first time after trial assert error in a motion for new trial).
See also Beehive Medical Electronics v. Square D. Company, 669
P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1983) (defendant's expansion on grounds for
objections below in a motion for new trial did not cure the lack

Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
part that the failure to raise motions concerning the
admissibility of evidence in writing at least five days prior to
trial constitutes waiver. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d). Therefore,
the trial court could have properly refused to consider
defendant's subsequent motions for new trial and arrest of
judgment on grounds that the suppression issue upon which
defendant placed primary reliance had been waived.
-7-

of timeliness in making proper objections to the trial court).
Because the record does not indicate that the trial court's
ruling was an abuse of discretion, the denial of defendant's
motion to arrest judgment on the merits is not subject to
reversal.

See State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)

(trial court's denial of motion for new trial will not be
disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion).
It might be argued that a defendant may raise a
suppression issue in a post-trial motion because Rule 12(d) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure further provides "that the
court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver."
However, this would be an unreasonably broad reading of that
provision.

Although the trial court heard defendant's

substantive arguments concerning the suppression issue upon which
defendant based his motion to arrest judgment, there is no
indication in the record that the trial court either explicitly
or implicitly found "cause" to grant defendant relief pursuant to
Rule 12(d) in this instance.

Furthermore, Rule 12(d) should not

be read to allow a defcmdant who fails to file a motion to
suppress either prior to trial, or, at the latest, during trial,
before the disputed evidence is admitted, to show "cause" for
relief from waiver for the first time in a post-trial motion.
See State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 85 (Utah 1985) (defendant
precluded from raising issue of whether juror was incapable of
impartially weighing facts and applying law in postverdict
affidavit after failing to raise issue at voir dire); State v.
Lairby, 669 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984) overruled on other

grounds, State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989).
(defendant's failure to object to the legality of his arrest
prior to trial constitutes a waiver of that issue).

In

considering the scope of Rule 12(d) it is important to note the
explicit, limiting language of Rule 12(b)(1) which states ••[t]he
following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
. . . motions concerning the admissibility of evidence."

Thus,

Rule 12(b)(1) lends support to the view that a postverdict motion
5
to suppress is not timely.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
INADEQUATE TO ALLOW THIS COURT TO
MEANINGFULLY REVIEW THE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Alternatively, should this Court determine defendant's
claims were timely made, defendant has failed to prepare a
reviewable record on appeal and this case should be remanded to
the trial court for additional findings.
This Court has stated on numerous occasions that
findings of facts underlying a trial court's decision to deny a
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless they
are clearly erroneous.

State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770

(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 881 (Utah
Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah
1990); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989).

This Court also has stated that

Similarly, Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
provides that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits evidence in the absence of a timely objection, stating the
specific ground of objection.
_Q_

it can afford a trial court's decision substantial deference only
when the findings disclose "the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached."

Lovegren, 798

P.2d at 770 (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882 n.l).

In

so stating, this Court noted the particular need for detailed
findings in search and seizure cases because of their highly fact
sensitive nature.

Ld.

In Lovegren, as here, the critical facts

were greatly disputed.

There, the failure of the trial court to

make adequate written or even oral findings left this Court with
a record that did not "'clearly and uncontrovertedly support the
trial court's' ultimate decision."

IA.

Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).

at 770 (quoting Acton v.
This Court noted that

"[t]hough the decision not to suppress may have been correct, the
critical issues are for the trial court to decide and . . . the
findings of fact must reveal how the court resolved each material
issue.'"

Id. (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d at 999). In

the instant case the trial court's oral findings of fact did not
meet the requirement foi: specific findings and would not allow
this Court to meaningfully review the appellate issues.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he burden of showing
error is on the party who seeks to upset the judgment." State v.
Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982). Therefore, even though
remand for the entry of more complete findings is an appropriate
remedy, notwithstanding the above, this Court could properly
retain jurisdiction of this case and assume the regularity of the
proceedings below and affirm his conviction because defendant has
failed to provide a reviewable record on appeal. Jolivet v.
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should
affirm the ruling below, or, in the alternative, remand this case
to the trial court for more detailed findings of fact.
DATED this

^^^^

day of December, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

~fl1a)ti**A-&£iki/^

CAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Appellee's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Kenneth R. Brown, Attorney for Appellant, 10 West 300 South,
Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this

/Q

day of December,

1990.

^Aihu/A £W'QeK.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS
BELGARD, DAYTON JAY

CASE NUMBER 891900995 FS
DATE 12/18/89
HONORABLE RAYMOND S UNO
COURT REPORTER KEN ALLEN
COURT CLERK LSN

DEFENDANT
JAIL
TYPE OF HEARING:
SENTENCING
PRESENT: DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. HUFNAGLE, WENDY
D. ATTY. JOHNSON, HOWARD

THIS CASE COMES NOW ON REGULARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND SENTENCING. APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE.
BASED UPON ARGUMENTS OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED. SENTENCING IS
CONTINUED TO JANUARY 31, 1990 @ 9 AM.
COPY TO AP&P

ADDENDUM B
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THE COURT:

Well therefs sort of a different

perspective on why the officer approached the motel room.
One is that there was sufficient probable cause, and the
other is that the probable cause was still not established
at that particular time.

Because he was not aware of who

was in there, how many people were in there, if the people
who he thought might have taken the car were in there, or
if they might have been someone else.

And based on that, I

think the state's theory is that he was continuing to
investigate to determine who occupied the premises, and if
they were the people who were involved in the theft of the
vehicle.
Defendant's theory is that there was sufficient
probable cause, because the identity of the vehicle was not
in question, because it's positively identified by the
state's man, having a peculiar cracked window that
identified the make of the car and that specific car.
And listening to arguments of counsel, and then
briefly reviewing the memorandum filed by both, the court,
essentially being apprised again of the facts of the case,
is of the opinion that defendant's motion to suppress at
this time should be denied, and the court is of the opinion
that based on the facts of this case, and the evidence that
was introduced into court, and is essentially recited by
both memorandums, with some slight differences, is that the

13

police officer who was involved in this case here, Officer
Maxwell, essentially did the things as recited by both
parties.
Came to the door, and I believe that this is
comparable to an essentially a Terry-type situation as
articulated by the state.

The Payton case does show that

in certain circumstances similar to this that a warrant
should be secured, because a person's home is sacred under
the Fourth Amendment, which requires that a warrantless
search is, per se, unconstitutional unless it fits under
certain circumstances, exceptions.
And I believe that the state has carved out an
exception by recitation of the activities of police officer
Maxwell in making the investigation, essentially securing
the premises, knocking on the door, and it's a question of
his apprehensions and his experience as a police officer
that gives rise to a Terry-type situation that the state
has outlined in its analysis.
I think that when you're on the firing line, you
have to make certain decisions, and you have to use your
experience, training, and size up the situation as you
comprehend it to be.

And based on his training and

experience, he effected the arrest.
And based on that, in plain view, his testimony
is that the weapon was seen, and his prior knowledge and

14

experience again indicates that that could present a danger
to anyone to have a weapon thatfs in the possession of a
person that was involved in a crime, or suspected or
alleged crime, and that it was known that a weapon was
offered in exchange for the purchase of the vehicle.
Whether the weapon was operable or unloaded, I think the
cases hold, does not make any difference, because that's
something that the officer himself would not know.

So

based on that, the court is going to deny the motion at
this time.
MR. BROWN:

Your Honor, in terms of

clarification, for my benefit more than anyone else's, the
evidence that the court is relying upon was the evidence
that was presented in the sole hearing that we had; is that
correct?
THE COURT:

Right here, right.

His testimony

during the course of the hearing.
MR. BROWN:

The hearing that I was involved in?

Thank you.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

There's a question

of bail or something like that.
MR. BROWN:
set bail.

Well, yeah, there was the motion to

I don't know if the court wants to consider that

in view of the court's order.

But I did supply the court

with a motion, and attached to that a self-explanatory

ADDENDUM C
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KENNETH R. BROWN, Esq., #0458
BROWN & COX
Attorneys for Defendant
10 West 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-3550
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

vs.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR ARREST OF
JUDGMENT AND FOR SUPPRESSION
OF EVIDENCE

DAYTON J. BELGARD,

Case No. 891900995FS

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Raymond S. Uno, Judge

The Court having received evidence on February 21, 1990,
in connection with the defendant's Motion For Arrest of Judgment
and For Suppression of Evidence, and the Court having heard the
arguments of counsel, and after having reviewed the Memorandums in
support of the parties' various positions, and having considered
the

matter

and

being

fully

advised

therein,

now

enters

the

following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion for Arrest
of Judgment and for Suppression of Evidence be and the same is
hereby denied.
DATED this""2^

'day of A ^ V

1990.
BY THE COURT

By:.
Raymond S. Uno, Judge

